

## THE »VOLUNTARISTIC« TYPE OF YOGA IN PATANJALI'S YOGA-SŪTRAS.

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The origin of the constituent parts of the text of Patañjali's Yoga-sūtras is a hitherto unsolved problem, although several serious attempts have been made to analyze it and differentiate the texts belonging to various Yoga schools. In the Yoga-sūtras they have been arranged to form a compact book, although not a compact system. In Otto Strauss' apt characteristic,<sup>1)</sup> the Yoga-sūtras reader is aware at the first glance that the doctrines which have combined it are guided by the same tendencies, yet in detail they go their own respective ways. Strauss thought that any attempt at separating the individual aspects was a hopeless proposition, maybe for ever. This prediction was not justified, though the conditions necessary for a solution, as they are given by Strauss, are by no means complete.

Paul Deussen, who was the first to make such an attempt, was guided<sup>2)</sup> by an analogy with the Upanishads, each of which develops a fundamental idea in the doctrine of the *Ātman* in its own particular manner. And having explained the differences between the individual Upanishads by several Vedic schools having existed side by side, each of which had had its own text, Deussen proceeded to apply the same hypothesis, appropriately on the whole, to the various schools of Yoga, whose writings came to be collected in the Yoga-sūtras. Liebig<sup>3)</sup> dismissed Deussen's hypothesis of the origin of the Yoga-sūtras in a general manner, on next to no grounds, but due to later investigations, Deussen's hypothesis, although at the time still lacking substantiation, came to life again. H. Jacobi<sup>4)</sup> followed a very painstaking, yet successful road to determine the pre-Patañjali Yoga. J. W. Hauer undertook<sup>5)</sup> then to classify anew the underlying texts of the Yoga-sūtras on both material and grammatical evidence. At the same time he tried to prove that the *yogāṅga* text<sup>6)</sup> was the oldest one in the Yoga-sūtras, whose author according to him was Patañjali the grammarian. Hauer thought that the other texts had been composed later, in the first centuries A. D. They tried to imitate the style of the early text and even to insert material interpolations, as befitted the aggressive Buddhism.

Hitherto all attempts, however, have yielded little more than the outline of the real picture, to serve us in further investigation; and Hauer's achievement in differentiating some of the writings is the only

exception. In the course of the differentiation new problems to be gone into, new contradictions to be reconciled, are being struck, and by reason of that more thorough, new studies are needed, that Strauss' prediction of the hopelessness of the task may not come true.

It would not be reasonable to suppose that the commentaries should give us full support in our attempts at a classification, because of their tendency to unify and synthesize the Yogist philosophy. Yet it is this very tendency from which we are able to draw many a useful piece of argumentation. It is precisely this unifying effort that can be used in a convincing manner to determine the methodical principle of a dialectical nature, bringing about a change in quality upon an accumulation of quantity, following which the new quality reaffirms itself.<sup>7)</sup> In the course of my deductions I became aware of the existence of some problems, of which I proceed now to submit a solution concerning the *īśvarapraṇīdhāna* text.<sup>8)</sup> It is based upon an analysis of *cittavikṣepas*, or distractions of the *citta* (mind).

Hauer<sup>9)</sup> placed the *īśvarapraṇīdhāna* text (I. 23 sqq.) among the younger writings, although he never ventured to decide for its relative youth or antiquity as compared with the *nirodha* text.<sup>10)</sup> Deussen's difficulties with this text were greater, because he saw that *cittavikṣepas* were listed in I. 29—31 without any observable attempt at a rational arrangement of the individual terms.<sup>11)</sup>

It is, however, this very lack of order in the grouping of the terms that invites comparison with the carefully worked-out text of the *yogāṅgas*,<sup>12)</sup> for only by relating and comparing the individual Yoga schools, so far as they are represented in the Yoga-sūtras, shall we be able to reach satisfactory conclusions regarding the composition of the Yoga-sūtras. Incidentally, Hauer and Deussen assign their text different lengths. If we are to believe Hauer,<sup>13)</sup> *īśvarapraṇīdhāna* commences at I. 23 (and ends at I. 51), while Deussen would have it comprise the sūtras from I. 17 to I. 51. By equal right, however, we could declare the text from I. 30 to I. 51 to be a self-contained whole. This caused Strauss to speak of insurmountable difficulties. But the breaking-up of the text into the original writings can never help us in further deductions. If, however, we try it the other way back, and succeed first in ascertaining the natures, types and characters of Yogist schools in the Yoga-sūtras, it should give us the right angle for separating the writings with more safety. And this is just where our problem lies.

One circumstance, connected with the general aspect of this text, must be pointed out at the very start of our investigation. It is this: The text, labelled by J. W. Hauer as *īśvarapraṇīdhāna*,<sup>14)</sup> opens up from *saṃvega* (intensity)<sup>15)</sup> and the prerequisites for the final goal,<sup>16)</sup> i. e., *śraddhā*, *vīrya*, *smṛti*, *saṃādhi*, *prajñā* (belief, energy, mindfulness, con-

centration, insight). And this very *śraddhā* etc. B u d d h a has opposed to the Yoga doctrine of *Ālāra Kālāma*.<sup>17)</sup> Since in the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* text also the *maitrī* method, common to both Yoga and Buddhism, is inserted, the solution will be rather difficult, but extremely important for our knowledge of the Yogist movements. In one instance we encounter a Yogist school, marked by various elements both negative (such as *nirrodha*, *antarāyas*), and positive (*śraddhā*, *maitrī*), which betrays a trend that was under a strong pressure from Buddhism<sup>18)</sup> and had to supplement, or to amend, or better still, to prove that Yoga included all the possibilities of attaining the final goal. Such forbearance of all these possibilities makes itself really manifest in this text.

If we are to get anywhere with our text, we must therefore bear in mind that it is preceded by a passage on *śraddhā*, *vīrya* etc., further on *saṃvega*, on *Īśvara*; another circumstance is the stress which is distinctly laid upon volitional elements in connection with *cittavikṣepas* (distractions of the mind) and *cittaprasādana* (undisturbed calm of the mind). One element, *saṃvega* (intensity), has several stages: *mṛdu* — *madhya* — *adhimātra* (gentle — moderate — keen). Then there are *śraddhā*, *vīrya*, and others, and ultimately *Īśvara* (*aīśvarya* = power, strength). It is interesting to note that even in this case V ā c a s p a t i<sup>19)</sup> linked *saṃādhi* to *yamas* and *niyamas*<sup>20)</sup> and to the *yogāṅga* text altogether.<sup>21)</sup> Such tendencies are true for all the commentators in general, and we shall have to bear them in mind in our further deductions.

Our text<sup>22)</sup> is sometimes inscribed as *īśvarapraṇidhāna*, and we will use this designation throughout. We will begin our analysis with a comparison of it and its procedure with the *yogāṅga* text.<sup>23)</sup> The latter shows marks of elaborateness and methodical self-containedness, and this well-ordered systematism endowed it with such importance that the commentators began to use it as the hub and starting-point in judging, interpolating and supplementing writings for other Yogist schools that became included in P a t a ṅ j a l i's Yoga-sūtras. In these texts, too, appears the methodical principle, characterized by dialectical opposition, change of quality as a result of an accumulation of quantity, with subsequent re-affirmation of the new quality.<sup>24)</sup> The Yoga aim is to bring about the reversal from the undiscriminated knowledge, which is a sign of impurity,<sup>25)</sup> towards the other pole, marked by the expressions: *vivekakhyāti*, *prajñā*, *nirbīja samādhi*, *kaivalya*.

The Yoga goal and methodical principle being in the writings the same, the latter are in agreement thus far; yet individual Yogist schools, represented here by their respective texts, show a different manner of approach to this road from *aśuddhi* to *kaivalya*. Both the starting-points and the stages of procedures may vary. With *yogāṅgas* we will start from *vitarkas*, with *kriyāyoga* from *kleśas*, with *nirrodha* from *vṛttis*, with *īśva-*

*rapraṇidhāna* from *antarāyas*. The *yogāṅga* text builds its methodical progress in eight members, rising gradually from *yamas* up to *samādhi*, while other texts choose other means and practices. As the texts reveal certain peculiarities in their methodical patterns, there is no other way but to credit them to independent Yogist schools that emphasized the importance of this or that experience according to the natures, practices, and successes of their respective founders or teachers.

### Cittavikṣepas and vikṣepasahabhuvas.

The starting-point of our analysis of the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* text<sup>1)</sup> shall be *cittavikṣepas* (distractions of the *citta*, mind) and *vikṣepasahabhuvas* (accompaniments of distractions).<sup>2)</sup> P a u l D e u s s e n<sup>3)</sup> mentioned them by name only.<sup>4)</sup> He held the whole text as "weniger abgeklärt" and belonging to those older than that of *yogāṅgas*,<sup>5)</sup> and if we look for some proof of this assertion we do not find any other than that the *antarāyas*,<sup>6)</sup> i. e., *cittavikṣepas*, are listed without any plan in the sequence of the terms.<sup>7)</sup> H. J a c o b i<sup>8)</sup> surmises that P a t a ṅ j a l i did not hesitate to borrow from Buddhism a doctrine that fitted his own system.<sup>9)</sup> Finally, J. W. H a u e r,<sup>10)</sup> basing on J a c o b i and Laṅkāvatāra-sūtras (on *sa-māpatti*), infers, that the first book of the Yoga-sūtras originates in the first centuries of our era, though he does not offer any opinion on whether also the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* text is older or younger than the rest of the first book. J a c o b i's opinion as to the borrowing of the text from Buddhism H a u e r puts right in that sense, that more probably some common tradition is involved.

The difficulty of which we spoke at the beginning is made evident by the mere fact that from the same elements so contradictory conclusions could have been formed; but we can venture upon the determination of the time of the formation of these texts only after clearing up the issues arising from the differentiation of the texts. It is a set of problems of vital importance, namely, whether the expressions in I. 30 are lacking order, what is the relationship of the methods for removing *cittavikṣepas*, what type is precisely of the Yoga school in question, etc.

The distractions of the mind are listed by P a t a ṅ j a l i in I. 30 and 31, thus:

I. 30: *vyādhi-styāna-saṁśaya-pramāda-ālasya-avirati-bhrāntidarśana-alabdhabhūmikatva-anavasthitatvāṇi cittavikṣepās te antarāyāḥ* = sickness, languor, doubt, heedlessness, listlessness, worldliness, erroneous perception, failure to attain any stage (of concentration), and instability in the state (when attained) — these distractions of the *citta* are the obstacles.

I. 31: *duḥkha-daurmanasya-aṅgamejayatva-śvāsa-praśvāsā vikṣepasahabhuvaḥ* = pain, despondency, unsteadiness of the body, inspiration and expiration are the accompaniments of the distractions.

From the fourteen given terms only three occur in P a t a ṇ j a l i's subsequent sūtras. *Śvāsa* and *praśvāsa* belong to *prāṇāyāma*,<sup>11)</sup> *duḥkha* occurs in a few places only.<sup>12)</sup> It is evident that the support P a t a ṇ j a l i might lend for an explanation is next to negligible, whereas the commentators, with their zeal for synthesis are sure to yield the proper guide-line; more support will be found in Buddhism and Jainism, provided that the assumption of the existence of a common tradition of these three movements be correct.

S. L i n d q u i s t<sup>13)</sup> pairs the mentioned terms to the Buddhist *nīvaranās* in the following way: *avirati* — *kāmacchanda*; *styāna* and *ālasya* — *thīnamiddha*; *pramāda* and *bhrāntidarśana* (eventually also *alabdhabhūmikatva* and *anavasthitatva*) — *uddhaccakukkucca*; *saṁśaya* — *vicikicchā*. Instances of such analogies, though, can be found quite often even in the commentators of the Yoga-sūtras.

By way of example, let us make a comparison of the above list with the Jainist Yoga in H e m a c a n d r a.<sup>14)</sup> *Avirati* stands there (in IV. 77, 83) already for "continued sinning against the five great *vratas*", and *pramāda* is to be found in several places (I. 19, III. 80, IV. 77, 83), also opposed: *pramāda* — *apramāda* (prudence — imprudence), just as against *avirati* stood *sāvadyayogahāna* (perseverance in the forbidden — aloofness from despicable actions). Here W i n d i s c h aptly recalls<sup>15)</sup> that in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* *avirati* means lack of control of the senses, hence something contrary to *pratyāhāra*. In II. 11 H e m a c a n d r a gives *vicikitsā* and *mithyādr̥ṣṭipraśamsanam tat samstavaśca* (doubt, respect to wrong doctrines and familiarity with them), which would correspond to *saṁśaya* and *bhrāntidarśana* of P a t a ṇ j a l i. Comparatively greater agreement in both terms and meanings will be found in Haṭhayogapradīpika, such as for *vyādhi* in many places,<sup>16)</sup> *saṁśaya* in I. 51, IV. 42, *ālasya* in II. 55, *vikṣepa* in IV. 32; similarly *vepana* III. 29 = *aṅgamejayatva*, *viṣaya-tyāga* IV. 9 = *avirati*, *lauhya* I. 15 (= unsteadiness), *śvāsa*, II. 17, 25, IV. 31 etc.

Such agreements and similitudes alone should suffice to induce us to analyze *antarāyas* in relation to *yogāṅgas* in more detail, and use the resulting new knowledge to solve the riddle of P a t a ṇ j a l i's Yoga-sūtras.

*Cittavikṣepas* and *vikṣepasahabhuvās*<sup>17)</sup> as opposed to *cittaprasādana*<sup>18)</sup> and possibly also to *adhyātma prasāda*<sup>19)</sup> are in P a t a ṇ j a l i's Yoga-sūtras quite distinct opposites. The commentators, however, preferred to pair against one another *vikṣepas* and *samādhi*, because the text, upon enumerating the *antarāyas* and the methods for their removal as well as for the attainment of *cittaprasādana*, proceeds immediately to analyzing *samādhi*, including *sabīja samādhi* with four degrees of *samāpatti*, and *nirbīja samādhi*. This is the reason why V y ā s a<sup>20)</sup> denotes



*vikṣepas* as *yogapratipakṣās*, *samādhipratipakṣās*, *Bhōja* as *ekāgratāvirodhī* (opposed to *ekāgratā*), to I. 47 as *samādhyantarāyas*; to II. 4 he connects them with the *kleśas* (i. e. *avidyā* etc.), for they cause distractions of the mind, *cittavikṣepas*. Then further down, in III. 3, *Bhōja* correlates *vikṣepas* with *samādhi*: *samyak ādhīyata ekāgrī kriyate vikṣepān parihṛtya yatra manah sa samādhiḥ* = *Samādhi* means literally that state (of knowledge), in which the mind, having avoided the distractions, is well fixed on, or confined to, one object only.

There is nothing striking in such connection of *cittavikṣepas* and *sahabhuvas*, because their links with the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* method<sup>21)</sup> show unmistakably that the direct progress towards *samādhi* was involved. The commentators are quite explicit about it.<sup>22)</sup>

From the way the commentators deal with the group of *antarāyas*<sup>23)</sup> it is nothing more than individual articles arranged horizontally, whilst turning to *yogāṅgas* we behold a vertical structure into which they evolve. From such observations P. D e u s s e n was quite entitled to conclude<sup>24)</sup> that *antarāyas* were grouped "ohne ersichtliche Anordnung der Begriffe". There is nothing easier than to conclude on the strength of it that in Yoga — in addition to and apart from the systematic eight-limb Yoga — there existed a trend that aimed directly at *samādhi*. The commentators mixed this movement with *īśvarapraṇidhāna*. Yet to pass such a judgment or its contrary it will only be possible when we have seen more closely how the *cittavikṣepas* and *vikṣepasahabhuvas* tally with the members in the *yogāṅga* text. Incidentally, we should be able to say that likewise in the *kriyāyoga* text,<sup>25)</sup> into which the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* method is also mingled, a direct method may be involved, because once *avidyā* is removed, *kaivalya*<sup>26)</sup> comes about. An attempt to overcome these difficulties, however, must be postponed for another occasion.

*Cittavikṣepas* and *sahabhuvas* are expressed mostly in a negative form. S. R a d h a k r i s h n a n<sup>27)</sup> points out quite with right that they admit the close connection of body and mind. The physical body is emphasized particularly in the *vikṣepasahabhuvas*, such as *duḥkha*, *aṅgamejayatva*, *śvāsa*, *praśvāsa*, and *vyādhi*. Though physical health is not an aim of human life, it is still one of its essential conditions. The body is the instrument for the expression of spiritual life. This admonition is of great consequence, although R a d h a k r i s h n a n immediately proceeds to the eightfold method, i. e. to *yogāṅgas*, to the removal of obstacles and hindrances. Having separated the signs relating to the body from those relating to the mind, he thereby fixed the guide-line for vertical build-up. It is possible and quite conceivable that *cittavikṣepas* and *vikṣepasahabhuvas* are in certain relationship to the members of *yogāṅgas* and that this relationship should reflect itself also in the methods referred to in subsequent sūtras.

This hypothesis is quite legitimate; the signs we can find at the first glance are congruent, even though expressed in a negative form. Our analysis should better start with the signs in *vikṣepasahabhuvas*, it being easier from that side. Thus, *śvāsa-prāśvāsa*<sup>28)</sup> corresponds to the same term<sup>29</sup> in *prāṇāyāma*. V ā c a s p a t i M i ś r a then in his commentary<sup>30)</sup> points out that *śvāsa* (inbreathing) is opposed to proper breathing, since *śvāsa* is performed without volitional action (*anicchata*), and therefore is *samādhyāṅgarecaka virodhī*. Likewise *prāśvāsa* (outbreathing) is *samādhyāṅgapūraka virodhī*. The both signs are therefore opposed to *prāṇāyāma*.

*Aṅgamejayatva* (trembling, unsteadiness of the body) is usually connected by the commentators legitimately with *āsana*. Thus B h o j a says that it impedes steadiness either in prescribed postures or in mind.<sup>31)</sup> Further, B h o j a and V y ā s a argue that *āsana* removes just this trembling of the body.<sup>32)</sup>

*Daurmanasya* (distress, despondency, evil disposition) is an opposite of *saumanasya*,<sup>33)</sup> which is a result of the practice of *śaucā* in *niyamas*.

*Duḥkha* (grief, pain) is to be found as a sign of *vitarkas*<sup>34)</sup> with *yamas* and *niyamas*; its opposite is a sign to be found with *āsana*<sup>35)</sup> and with *saṁtoṣa*.<sup>36)</sup>

In respect to the sequence in I. 31 and following the comparison with *yogāṅgas* we obtain the following scale: *duḥkha* belongs into the first (or also second, third) limb of *yogāṅgas*; *daurmanasya* into the second constituent, *niyamas*; *aṅgamejayatva* into the third, *āsana*; *śvāsa-prāśvāsa* into the fourth, *prāṇāyāma*. The horizontal pattern of *vikṣepasahabhuvas* in its negative form follows the pattern of the *yogāṅga* vertical from the first to the fourth limb. Such comparison justifies *vikṣepasahabhuvas* as a logical and practical progression.

More difficulties emerge if we compare *antarāyas* and *yogāṅgas*, because outwardly no features common to both are seen. In a few instances, however, we shall be able to establish, with the aid of the commentaries, a distinct relationship with *yogāṅgas*.

So by defining *vikṣepasahabhuvas* and finding them places in the eight-limb pattern of *yogāṅgas* we have obtained a criterion so far as the body-to-mind relationship is concerned. V i j ñ ā n a B h i k ṣ u<sup>37)</sup> splits *yogāṅgas* into two groups: the first one is that comprising *yama* till *pratyāhāra* and consisting in the control of the body, breath and the senses while the other, including the further three limbs starting by *dhāraṇā* consists in the control of the mind. The first five tend only to the purification of the body, the breath and the senses, whereas the last three tend to the purification of the mind.<sup>38)</sup>

In a way, the discrimination into *cittavikṣepas* and *vikṣepasahabhuvas*

may be accounted for as a positive response to the *yogāṅga* division, which we find in all the commentaries.

There can be no dispute that of the *sahabhūvas* to the body and the breath belong: *aṅgamejayatva*, *śvāsa* and *praśvāsa*. With *duḥkha* and *daurmanasya*, the commentators establish causes both physical and spiritual. The next sign, belonging to the fifth limb *pratyāhāra*, is already among the *cittavikṣepas*. It is *avirati* (addiction to objects of the senses, absence of non-attachment, worldliness). Vyāsa and Bhoja<sup>39)</sup> define *avirati* in agreement with each other: *Aviratiścittasya viśayasamprayogātmā gardhaḥ* = Worldliness is greed of the mind and its essence lies in an addiction to objects of the senses. The term *viśayasamprayoga* is an opposite to Patañjali's sign belonging to *pratyāhāra* as *viśaya-asamprayoga*.<sup>40)</sup> Thus *avirati* is a negative designation of *pratyāhāra*.

Upon *avirati* should logically follow the next limb of *yogāṅgas*, *dhāraṇa*. Yet *bhrāntidarśana*, which is the expression after *avirati*, is a hard nut to crack even for our commentators. Both Vyāsa and Bhoja interpret it as *viparyaya-jñāna* (the thinking of misconceptions). According to I. 8 *viparyaya* is: *mithyajñānam atadrūpa-pratiṣṭham* (an erroneous idea not based on that form), which Vyāsa links with *kleśas* and particularly with *avidyā*.<sup>41)</sup> According to Vyāsa, upon the dwindling of this follows the manifestation of focused thinking, *samyagjñāna*.<sup>42)</sup> Vyāsa employs also the expression *samyagdarśana*,<sup>43)</sup> focused insight, which is used to remove *avidyā*. In this conception of Vyāsa again there is marked effort to join the isolated members in a unity. What interests us in this conception most is that Vyāsa was aware of *bhrāntidarśana* being an opposite to *samyagdarśana*, and thanks to that he was able to associate it to the last three limbs in the *yogāṅga* pattern.

It duly follows that the next limb is a consequence of *bhrāntidarśana*. *Alabdhabhūmikatva* (failure to attain any stage, according to the commentators) means not attaining any stage of concentration (*samādhi*), and the last limb, *anavasthitatva*, is instability in the state when attained. It is interesting to mark how the commentators define this last limb. Thus Vyāsa:<sup>44)</sup> *labdhāyāṁ bhūmau cittasya-apratiṣṭhā*; Bhoja: *labdhāyāmapī samādhibhūmau cittasya-apratiṣṭhā*. *Apratiṣṭhā*, however, is the opposite of *pratiṣṭhā*, a word by which Patañjali<sup>45)</sup> expresses the reaffirmation of the qualities acquired as a result of practice (*siddhis*). Hence this term involves a negative characteristic of the last phase of the quantitative effort, as a result of which one quality passes into a new, desired quality. The placing of this item at the end of the list is then quite justified.

The other items (*vyādhi* till *ālasya*) are developed particularly in the Hāṭhayoga, as we have already pointed out. But the problem to be solved is not merely what conclusions as to the rationality in the arrangement



of their members the juxtapositions of *cittavikṣepas* and *vikṣepasahabhuvas* alongside the appropriate *yogāṅgas* enable us to form, but principally what is the general class and character of these members. Up to now we have established that *cittavikṣepas* and *vikṣepasahabhuvas* are enumerated in a horizontal row and characterized negatively, whereas the *yogāṅga* row is vertical and positive.

Since the subsequent text<sup>46)</sup> adduces also the exercises for their removal, it may be assumed that these exercises, too, will reveal the same signs as those in the *yogāṅgas*.

### The Methods for the Removal of *cittavikṣepas*.

When examining the methods, their lack of any systematic disposition is what strikes us in the first place. It can be supposed that they were brought together or added successively without any plan. They are introduced by the requirements for attaining *asaṃprajñāta samādhi*:<sup>1)</sup> *śraddhā* — *vīrya* — *smṛti* — *samādhi* — *prajñā* (belief — energy — mindfulness, concentration — insight). Thereupon follows the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* method with its results.<sup>2)</sup> Then there is the *ekatattva-abhyāsa* method, striving for the same goal.<sup>3)</sup> Further down seven more methods, aiming at the attainment of *citta-prasādana* (unwavering calm of the mind), are indicated.

The *īśvarapraṇidhāna* method, which we will discuss lower down, is included in the *yogāṅgas*. Another method<sup>4)</sup> belongs to *prāṇāyāma*: *prachardana vidhāraṇābhyāsaṃ vā prāṇasya* = or (he gains stability) by expulsion and retention of breath. *Vyāsa*<sup>5)</sup> in his commentary cites also I. 34, for not only the methods, but their results, too, are parallel: i. e., the attainment of the stability of the mind. *Bhoja*<sup>6)</sup> distinctly identifies both: *yatra yatra dhāryate tatra tatra sthiraṃ bhavati na vikṣepaṃ bhajate* = Wherever it (i. e., *manas*) is directed to, there it remains fixed, and does not suffer from distractions.

The dialectical structure of the basic method for *citta-prasādana*<sup>7)</sup> promptly reminds us of the dialectic of *pratipakṣabhāvana*.<sup>8)</sup> This is also the reason why all the commentators interpret it in the same manner. In contradistinction, of course, to the negative *bhāvana* in the *yogāṅga* in question, the *cittaprasādana* method involves a positive *bhāvana*. On a comparison of the two methods we find that they are endowed with identical features: dialectical opposition, quantitative increase, resulting in a change of quality.

*Patañjali* himself formulates this method as follows: *maitrī-karuṇā-muditā-upekṣāṇāṃ sukha-duḥkha-puṇya-apuṇya-viṣayāṇāṃ bhāvanā-taś citta-prasādanam* = By the cultivation of friendliness towards happiness, and compassion towards pain, and joy towards merit, and indifference

towards demerit (the yogin should attain) the undisturbed calm of the mind.

B h o j a opposes *maitrī* (benevolence) to *ārṣya* (envy), *kṛpā* (tenderness) to *tāṭasthya* (disregard), *muditā* (joy) to *dveṣa* (aversion), *upekṣā/audāsīnya* (indifference/listlessness) to *anumādana/dveṣa* (sympathy/aversion). Later he explicitly opposes *dveṣarāgādipratipakṣabhūtamaitryādi*, for *rāgadveṣāveva mukhyatayā vikṣepamutpādayataḥ* = covetousness and aversion are the very chief raisers of distractions. Thus B h o j a connects the text of I. 33 with *kriyāyoga*<sup>9)</sup> and *yogāṅgas*.<sup>10)</sup>

V ā c a s p a t i opposes: *maitrī/sauhārda* (friendliness/cordiality) to *ārṣya* (envy), *karuṇā* (compassion) to *parāpakāracikīrṣā* (desire to injure others), *muditā/harṣa* (joy/gladness) to *asūya* (jealousy), *upekṣā/mādhya-sthya* (indifference/neutrality) to *amarśa* (wrath).

The dialectical manner of procedure (with a *bhāvana* both positive and negative), however, brings about results that are identical. With *yamas*, it was the reversal from *himsā* to *ahimsā*, etc., that was effected; with *maitrī* it is one to *cittaprasādana*. The change of quality through quantity is distinctly perceived also by the commentators. V y ā s a<sup>11)</sup> says: *evamasya bhāvayataḥ śuklo dharma upajāyate* = When he thus cultivates (i. e., friendliness, etc.), the white quality (of *karma*) comes into being. W o o d s<sup>12)</sup> cites conformable places in II. 13 and IV. 7. V ā c a s p a t i in his commentary then observes: *tataścāsya rājasatāmasadharmanivṛttau sāttvikāḥ śuklo dharma upajāyate* = And then, after the qualities made of *rajas* and of *tamas* have ceased, the white quality made of *sattva* comes into being. At this occasion V ā c a s p a t i<sup>13)</sup> again connects I. 33 with *kriyāyoga* II. 1 and with *yogāṅgas*. Actually he goes farthest of the commentators and postulates the progress in the *yogāṅgas* as dependent on the cultivation of friendliness: And when undisturbedly calm, through means which are to be stated, it becomes single-in-intent and gains the stable state. But if there be no cultivation of friendliness and the rest, these means are not adequate for stability.

Another effect brought about by the use of identical methods is the reaffirmation of quality into perfection, as we can see<sup>14)</sup> in the passage dealing with the attainment of *vaśīkāra* (mastery).

Yet an entirely new set of problems bound with the *īśvarapranīdhāna* text comes to light during the enumeration and discussion of so many methods, placed as equivalent side by side. It relates in the first place to the *īśvarapranīdhāna* method itself<sup>15)</sup> in its relationship to the *eka-tattva-abhyāsa* method,<sup>16)</sup> and maybe also to methods referred to further down.

The *īśvarapranīdhāna* text is supposed to be a self-contained writing of one Yoga movement. The questions that remain still unsolved are: where does this text actually start at, what was the manner in which the

Buddhist *śraddhā* etc., *maitrī* etc., became part of the text, what is the true function of the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* method in the text, and a host of other problems that must be touched upon later.

Paul Deussen<sup>17)</sup> allots to the text the sūtras I. 17—51, while J. W. Hauer<sup>18)</sup> only those beginning with I. 23 till I. 51. Both of them claim to have included the whole pertaining to the Yoga school in question. While Deussen took *samādhi* as his criterion, Hauer on the other hand to the same end used *Īśvara*. Neither of them ventured to give some explanation why the *nirodha* text and the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* text hang together so closely precisely through *abhyāsa* I. 32 and *nirodha* I. 51, the terms that are so vital in the *nirodha* text. Would it mean that one and the same Yoga school in two denominations should be here involved — one with and one without *Īśvara* — and should this second *nirodha* movement represent a reform of the first under the pressure of subsequent Buddhism, to ward off the dangers concealed in the nihilistic psycho-technique of the *nirodha* text?<sup>19)</sup> Shall we put up with the assurance of Jacob<sup>20)</sup> that Patañjali and his school unhesitatingly absorbed everything in Buddhism and Jainism that could answer their purpose — an idea that even Hauer<sup>21)</sup> is loath to accept and prefers to assume a common tradition?

The solution of this set of problems involves a good many detailed investigations, particularly of typological nature, from which only we can draw conclusions. Our purpose will be best answered by examining two analogous methods for the removal of *antarāyas*, referred to by Patañjali<sup>22)</sup> consecutively one after the other. The *īśvarapraṇidhāna* method determines the manner of practice and the results (I. 28): *tajjapas tadarthabhāvanam* = repetition of it (i. e., *Om*) and reflection upon its meaning (should be made). By dint of this, twofold results are obtained (I. 29): *tataḥ pratyakcetanādhigamo 'pyantarāyābhāvaśca* = thereafter comes the knowledge of thinking in an inverse way and the absence of obstacles. Vyāsa<sup>24)</sup> identifies *pratyakcetanā* with *svarūpe 'avasthānam* = (the Self) abides in himself (the abiding in the form of soul). This state is then identical with *kaivalya* (isolation). With *yogāṅgas* this result corresponds to *samādhi-siddhi*<sup>25)</sup> — the perfection of concentration. Vācaspati recalls here that the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* method progresses straight to *samādhi*, so that it is unnecessary to practise the preceding seven limbs of Yoga. This assertion may be borne out also by the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* text I. 23 sqq. and by *kriyāyoga* II. 1 sqq., since here, too, a method speeding directly towards *samādhi* II. 2 is cited: *samādhi-bhāvanā arthaḥ kleśatanūkarāṇa arthaśca* = it is for the purpose of establishing meditation and of attenuating afflictions.

Leaving aside the problems connected with *Īśvara* and the confused insertion in the Yoga-sūtra texts we see that the text of I. 23 till 29 (and

maybe till I. 31) discusses completely one whole Yoga school including *Īśvara*, and the importance of the latter is underlined by the circumstance that he was included both in *kriyāyoga* and the *yogāṅgas* and that Yoga itself was denoted by the name of *śeśvarasāṃkhya*.

This theory is confirmed also by the inclusion of another method serving to remove *cittavikṣepas* and *vikṣepasahabhuvas*. P a t a ṇ j a l i immediately upon the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* method<sup>26)</sup> cites the *ekatattva-abhyāsa* method:<sup>27)</sup> *tatpratiṣedha-artham ekatattva-abhyāsaḥ* = to check them (let there be) practice upon a single entity. From the hesitant and diverging explanations offered by the commentators we can conclude that it puzzled them how to connect it with the preceding text, the more so because P a t a ṇ j a l i himself proceeds to discuss seven other methods, of which that of *maitrī* etc. either became very popular precisely thanks to Buddhism or was included in Yoga directly on a Buddhist impulse. The value of all these methods, including that of *īśvarapraṇidhāna*, is determined by the last one, given in I. 39: *yathā abhimata dhyānād vā* = or by contemplation upon any such object as is desired. *Vā* (or), which occurs, incidentally, with all the methods,<sup>28)</sup> marks also their equivalence, yet in a less striking way. The last method, however, levels them out and brings all the other methods to the same niveau.

Now while it seems merely probable that the *maitrī* method<sup>29)</sup> should have been included in Yoga on an impulse from or under the pressure of Buddhism, it is certain that it was assigned rather a secondary place in P a t a ṇ j a l i's Yoga-sūtras. As yet there is not a straight answer to the question if this inclusion was a direct reaction on the words of B u d d h a,<sup>30)</sup> by which he criticized the results of the Yogist exercises of his teachers Ā ḷ ā r a K ā l ā m a and U d a k a R ā m a p u t t a and opposed to them *śraddhā* — *vīrya* — *smṛti* — *samādhi* — *prajñā*, which are the presuppositions P a t a ṇ j a l i mentions for *nirodha* (I. 20). The direct dependence on Buddhism, assumed by J a c o b i, however, seems less plausible than H a u e r's reference to common sources from which Buddhism, Yoga and Jainism should have drawn.

Nevertheless, this is a point which is also outside the scope of the present discussion, because we endeavour primarily to determine more closely the type of the Yogist school extant in the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* text, and to solve the problem why particularly in this text so diverging schools became combined. Unfortunately the only light than can guide us in this task can emanate from the bewilderment of the commentators.

V y ā s a<sup>31)</sup> links the *ekatattva-abhyāsa* method with I. 12, although P a t a ṇ j a l i himself mentions only *abhyāsa* (practice) and not *vairāgya* (passionlessness). Thereby V y ā s a brings this method into the *nirodha* text. Afterwards he throws in an extensive discourse to overthrow the Buddhist theory of *kṣaṇika* (momentary *citta*), and argues that conse-

quently the *citta* is one, has many objects and is stable (*tasmād ekam anekārtham avasthitam ca cittam*). V ā c a s p a t i likewise supplements P a t a ṇ j a l i by the following correction: *yadyapi īśvarapranīdhānād ity abhyāsamātram uktam tathāpi vairāgyam iha tatsakāritayā grāhyam* = Although the words beginning "By devotion to *Īśvara*" (I. 23) refer to practice only, still in this case passionlessness must be deemed to be a co-operator with this (practice). Finally B h o j a simply declares that here is another method for the checking of the obstacles (*upāyāntaramāha*).

So one problem — why here was only *abhyāsa* (practice) — was already discovered by the commentators. Yet opinions are also at variance in the explanations offered for the term *ekatattva*. E. g., V ā c a s p a t i thinks fit to link the method in question also in this direction with *īśvarapranīdhāna*, identifying *ekatattva* with *Īśvara* because he is the subject-matter of the discussion.<sup>32)</sup> B h o j a allows any single entity.<sup>33)</sup> Even such a qualification is significant for our understanding of the epoch in which the commentators were living. V y ā s a wrote his polemics in a period when Buddhism stood in the foreground, V ā c a s p a t i M i ś r a in defending Yoga stood amidst an intense religious effort. Therefore it is symptomatic that V ā c a s p a t i M i ś r a extols *Īśvara*, while B h o j a does not pause to pass a judgment on methods in which the pressure of Buddhism was strongly felt, and links the *ekatattva* method with that of *dhyāna*.<sup>34)</sup> V y ā s a, as we have seen, has placed it with the *nirodha* method. This non-uniformity of opinion in the interpretations is a clear proof that in P a t a ṇ j a l i two methods, though identical in their goal, are inserted consecutively. That again may be an evidence of P a t a ṇ j a l i having combined two texts, one of these being that of the *īśvarapranīdhāna* method,<sup>35)</sup> and their mutual links being *cittavikṣepas* and *vikṣepasahabhuvas*.

Even the rounding off of this method by the attainment of a *siddhi*<sup>36)</sup> is a proof of its completeness. In the same way as *īśvarapranīdhāna* is terminated<sup>37)</sup> by attaining *pratyakcetanā*, which is its *phala* (result), so the discourse on *ekatattva abhyāsa* is finished by attaining *vaśīkāra* (mastery), which is its *phala*. The word *phala* (fruit, result) is explicitly used by both B h o j a and V ā c a s p a t i M i ś r a. It is identical with the meaning of the term *siddhi* (perfection), used by the commentators to describe the perfections attained through *yogāṅgas*.

If we can solve the question why in the *ekatattva* method P a t a ṇ j a l i availed himself of the term *abhyāsa* only, it will solve also another, why several methods came to be unified in one text, for they must possess some other common denominator.

### The typical "voluntaristic" orientation.

Viewed from the methodical side, the common base for these so dif-





fering texts — *nirodha*, *īśvarapraṇidhāna*, *ekatattva-abhyāsa*, *maitrī*, etc. — is indisputably dialectic with the change of quality as a result of an accumulation of quantity. This methodical principle, however, is common to the entire Yoga process, it making no difference whether *yogāṅgas*, *kriyāyoga*, or *īśvarapraṇidhāna* are involved.<sup>1)</sup> In unifying their different underlying texts, the commentators retained this common methodical base. A point of dispute remains, whether Patañjali failed to create a unified synthesis out of the different available texts, as claimed by Strauss,<sup>2)</sup> or whether Patañjali took over suitable methods from Buddhism and Jainism, as claimed by Jacobi.<sup>3)</sup>

This is a question that involves a further investigation of the types of the individual texts of the Yoga-sūtras. J. W. Hauer,<sup>4)</sup> who considered the structure and nature of some of them, paid attention only to the outward aspect of the texts, and besides separating them from one another as self-contained trains of reasoning he did nothing to account for their inherent contradictions or for the contradictions between individual texts.

It is a remarkable thing e. g. with *īśvarapraṇidhāna* that all the texts when speaking about it carry the expression *bhāvana*. Thus in the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* text in I. 28: *tajjapas tad-artha-bhāvanam*, in the *kriyāyoga* text in II. 2: *samādhibhāvanā-arthaḥ*, in the *yogāṅga* text in II. 33, 34: *pratipakṣabhāvanam*. *Bhāvana* manifests identical features with *abhyāsa*. On the authority of the commentaries, both signify *punaḥpunaścitte nivesanam*, or quantitative increase, in other words a gradation of intensity, which happens to fit Patañjali's definition of *abhyāsa* in I. 13 and 14. In the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* text (I. 23 sqq.) *bhāvana* appears yet in the *maitrī* method in I. 33, and *abhyāsa* in the *ekatattva* method in I. 32.

The one conclusion that can be drawn from these conspicuous facts is that the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* method is consistently characterized by the expression *bhāvana*. Moreover, that in the *ekatattva* method,<sup>5)</sup> immediately before, the term *abhyāsa* is used, although the methods in their implications are identical. This difference suggests another text, varied from the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* text. The differences are very plainly reflected in the embarrassed interpretations of the commentators, for we do not find the other term — *vairāgya* (passionlessness). The *nirodha* text refers to *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya*, on which *nirodha* (restriction of the fluctuations of the mind) depends.<sup>6)</sup> This made the commentators Vyāsa, Vācaspati and Bhōja mention *vairāgya* in their comments as an integrant part to *abhyāsa*, for thereby they wanted to harmonize this text with the *nirodha* text.

To form an opinion on the nature of the text, however, it is especially important to note the following considerations of the commentators. Vyāsa:<sup>7)</sup> *tatrābhyāsasya viṣayam upasaṃharann idam āha* = of these

(i. e., of *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya*), in summing up, he describes the object, to which the practice (applies). To this let us recall Vācaspati's already cited words: *yadyapi īśvarapraṇidhānād ity abhyāsamātram uktam tathāpi vairāgyam iha tatsakāritayā grāhyam*, according to whose opinion the words beginning "īśvarapraṇidhānādvā..." (I. 23) refer to practice only. Vijñāna Bhikṣu<sup>8</sup>) before the enumeration points out six methods (I. 33—I. 39, *parikarmas*): *idānīm abhyāsasyāntaraṅgaṃ sādhanam parikarmādikam ucyate* = Now are described the means essential to exercise, such as the purificatory action (*parikarma*), and the like.

It appears that according to the commentators the only and principal feature of the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* text<sup>9</sup>) should be *abhyāsa* (exercise). Let us recall that the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* text is preceded by a few sūtras on *saṃvega* (intensity),<sup>10</sup>) which has three stages (*mṛdu* — *madhya* — *adhi-mātra*). *Abhyāsa*, whose feature is *yatna* (effort), is a manifestation of volition.<sup>11</sup>) Vācaspati Miśra adds an interesting and symptomatic remark that the means for attaining the *sthiti* are the *yogāṅgas*.

From the abovesaid a further conclusion may be deduced, viz., that the methods prescribed by the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* text<sup>12</sup>) were all volitional. From this again follows that features of volitional character should become manifest not only in the *cittavikṣepas* and *sahabhuvas* but also in the methods prescribed and in the results attained. If the validity of this premise could be confirmed by an examination of those elements, then all the textual difficulties could be removed.

One very appropriate quotation from Bhoja can be adduced<sup>13</sup>) to characterize *cittavikṣepas* and *sahabhuvas*: *Antarāyā vakṣyamāṇās teṣāṃ abhāvaḥ śaktipratibandho bhavati* = The obstacles will be mentioned, the absence of the latter means the expulsion of their power. Herein Bhoja gave full justice to the voluntaristic nature of the *antarāyas*. The voluntaristic features of these obstacles stand out very clearly when subject to an examination. The commentators, too, were aware of their voluntaristic orientation, and quite explicit about it. Thus for *styāna*: *styānamakarma-nyatā cittasya* = languor is a lack of activity of the *citta* (Vyāsa, Bhoja); for *pramāda* they stressed *audāsīnya* (listlessness; Bhoja) and *abhāvana* (i. e., an opposite to *punaḥ punar niveśana*, as in Vyāsa); for *ālasya* it was *apravṛtti* (Vyāsa) and *pravṛttyabhāva* (want of exertion; Bhoja); for *avirati* it was *gardha* (greediness; Vyāsa and Bhoja) and *trṣṇā* (Vācaspati). *Samśaya* (doubt) implies irresolution, not merely ratiocination (Bhoja); Vyāsa and Vācaspati have for it a very appropriate expression: *sparsa* (touching, groping, feeling one's way). With others the emphasis on their volitional aspect is quite obvious. Thus we get a new assessment of the *antarāyas* and a logical justification for their places, naturally not from a noetical but from the voluntaristic standpoint.

The same voluntaristic conception comes to light also in the cited methods. With the method of *pratiṣedha*<sup>14)</sup> Bhoja uses the phrase: *yadbalāt* (by force of which); with the *dhyāna* method<sup>15)</sup> there is the volitional expression *abhimata* (wished), and for *dhyāna* itself is given the feature *ekatānatā* (focusedness),<sup>16)</sup> interpreted in Vyāsa by the term *pravāha* (stream), in Vācaspati by *saṃtati* (uninterrupted continuance or succession). With the *prāṇa*-method<sup>17)</sup> there is *pracchardana-prayatna-viśeṣādvamana* (throwing up by a special kind of effort). Bhoja<sup>18)</sup> cites the *viśoka*-method for removing *śoka* (sorrow) by virtue of the exercise (*abhyāsabalāt*). In the *maitrī*-method<sup>19)</sup> a positive *bhāvana* is involved. After all, the *parikarma* methods as a whole belong to *abhyāsa*, as mentioned before.

The voluntaristic nature comes to the foreground also in the results achieved on using the methods referred to. For the *phala* (fruit) of *sthairya* (firmness) it is stated:<sup>20)</sup> *paramāṇuparamahattvānto 'sya vaśīkārah* — His mastery extends from the smallest atom to the greatest magnitude. Vyāsa here aptly remarks that the attainment of this mastery needs not again the purification perfected by practice, for the mastery is fortified (*na punarabhyāsakṛtaṃ parikarmāpekṣata iti*). And it is not without interest to see that the *yogāṅga*-text, too, knows only a volitional quality to represent the *siddhi* (perfection) of *maitrī* etc.:<sup>21)</sup> *maitryādiṣu balāni* — (as a result of *saṃyama*) following friendliness and the rest (there arise) powers. The voluntaristic aspect of this phrase is confirmed by Vyāsa who says: *tato balānyavandhyavīryāṇi jāyante* — from it arise powers of unfailing energy. In the same spirit explains then Vācaspati: *vīryam prayatnaḥ. Tena maitryādibalavataḥ pumsaḥ sukhitādiṣu pareṣāṃ karta-vyeṣu prayatno vandhyo na bhavatīti* — Energy is exertion. Through its agency a man who has the powers of friendliness, etc., towards persons in happiness, etc., becomes unfailing in his exertion when things are to be done for others.

It remains to be ascertained whether in the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* method,<sup>22)</sup> too, the voluntaristic principle is being applied, since in no other way is it possible to solve the problem why precisely this method was inserted in its entirety on this particular place of the Yoga-sūtra text.

But the very term *prāṇidhāna* is in itself voluntaristic, meaning great effort, energy, hence intense orientation towards *Īśvara*.<sup>23)</sup> According to Vyāsa it is achieved through *abhidhyāna* (longing, wish). The method is *taj-japas tad-artha-bhāvanam* — once more a volitional effort. The voluntaristic nature of the phrase *niratiśayam sarvajñabījaṃ* (the germ of the omniscient is at its utmost excellency) is again pointed out by Vyāsa.<sup>24)</sup> Even the word *Īśvara* means: the powerfull-one, Master; and Vyāsa<sup>25)</sup> analyzes precisely this power (*aīśvarya*), for power, too, is marked by an ascensional progression up to omnipotence. Finally *praty-*

*akcetanādhigama*,<sup>26)</sup> denoting the result of the method, according to V y ā s a stands for *svarūpadarśana* (the sight of own real self), which is a state like *kaivalya* (isolation), in which the energy of intellect (*citiśakti*) is grounded in its own self.<sup>27)</sup>

By right therefore V ā c a s p a ti<sup>28)</sup> emphasized the voluntaristic nature of *īśvarapraṇidhāna*, as we have already mentioned.

### Conclusion.

Having laid down the type of the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* text (I. 23 sqq.), viz., ascertained its voluntaristic nature, we can summarize the results.

The starting-point of our investigation were the difficulties of the text, in the first place the want of clarity and lack of plan in the disposition of the *antarāyas*; secondly, the placing of two identical methods for their removal in immediate succession; then, the use of the *abhyāsa* (exercise) method alone; then the admission of several methods functionally equivalent (*vā*) alongside each other, and lastly the addition of the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* method.

It took some pains to solve these difficulties, mainly because we could not have direct support of the commentators. The latter obviously endeavoured to bring into agreement various texts which are included in P a t a ṇ j a l i's Yoga-sūtras. P a t a ṇ j a l i has not presented Yoga as a unified system, but in his book are collected the writings of several movements and schools of Yoga, that P a t a ṇ j a l i or some final editor of the Yoga-sūtras ranged intentionally according to viewpoints then self-evident. To disclose precisely these viewpoints is the primary task of the investigator, who wants to penetrate into the entire set of Yoga problems at the time of P a t a ṇ j a l i and particularly prior to it.

When the type of the distractions of the *citta* and the methods for their removal had been determined as voluntaristic, all difficulties were promptly overcome. The thing seemed at first more difficult because of their enumeration on a horizontal plane, accompanied by the use of unusual expressions of negative nature. In comparison with the systematical and elaborate vertical pattern of *yogāṅgas*, the Yogist procedure seemed now to have suffered a sort of levelling. To D e u s s e n the *cittavikṣepas* seemed older because of the lack of marshalling, intention and arrangement. As soon as the type of the *vikṣepas* has been determined (from a voluntaristic, not noetical standpoint), the arrangement takes on cogency and under the voluntaristic criterion justifies even the use of negative terms, for the opposite of will is lack of will, feebleness, laziness, inconstancy and the like. Dialectical looking for volitional opposites (whose reflexions are also the bodily disorders, *vyādhī* and *vikṣepasahabhūvas*) has led to the establishing of not only logical sequence, but also the vertical progress,

which was checked up on comparing it with the systematic *yogāṅgas*. The orientation towards the goal and the use of the dialectical principle with a change of quality by an increase in quantity and the resulting fortification of the new quality, are in common. What is special for the particular types is the manner of exercise, or the methodical structure.

From the typological standpoint, identical volitional features appear both in the distractions of the *citta* and the *īśvarapranīdhāna* method, *pratiṣedha*, *parikarma*, as well as the attained result *vaśīkāra*. Incidentally it explains why the *īśvarapranīdhāna* method was intentionally included precisely in this text and why differing methods were enumerated side by side, for functionally they are equivalent. Quite logical must then appear also the addition of the *maitrī* etc., *śraddhā* etc. methods, because these methods, so strongly recommended by Buddha, on the typological side represent actually a supplement, development of Yogist methods, cultivated prior to Buddha, as we legitimately may suppose. Patañjali's Yoga-sūtras reflect in the texts the tolerance of Yoga and the readiness to adopt all methods, that had stood a proof of having contributed to a greater precision in the progress from *aśuddhi* to *kaivalya*.

As matters stand nowadays, it would be very troublesome to investigate the state of the primitive Yoga prior to Buddha, but the antiquity of some schools trickles forth even in Patañjali's Yoga-sūtras.

The voluntaristic type of the *īśvarapranīdhāna* text accounts also for its inclusion in the *nirodha* text, with which it is linked by the *abhyāsa*-exercise.

#### Footnotes to p p. 598—601.

<sup>1)</sup> Indische Philosophie, 1925, p. 194. <sup>2)</sup> Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, I. 3, p. 507 sqq. <sup>3)</sup> Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wiss., Phil.-hist. Kl., 1919. <sup>4)</sup> Sitzungsber. der Preuss. Akad. der Wiss., Phil.-hist. Kl., 1929: „Über das ursprüngliche Yoga-System.“ <sup>5)</sup> In: Studia Indo Iranica, 1931, „Das IV. Buch des Yogasūtra“, and particularly in „Der Yoga als Heilweg“, 1932. <sup>6)</sup> II. 28—III. 55. <sup>7)</sup> Archiv Orientální 1951, p. 194 sqq: „The methodical principle in Yoga according to Patañjali's Yoga-sūtras.“ <sup>8)</sup> I. 23 sqq., <sup>9)</sup> l. c., p. 92. <sup>10)</sup> l. c., p. 88. <sup>11)</sup> ohne ersichtliche Anordnung der Begriffe, l. c., p. 559. <sup>12)</sup> II. 28 sqq. <sup>13)</sup> as he argues on p. 84 sqq. <sup>14)</sup> I. 23—51. <sup>15)</sup> I. 23, 22. <sup>16)</sup> I. 20. <sup>17)</sup> Majjhima Nikāya, 26. <sup>18)</sup> See also *samāpatti*. <sup>19)</sup> to I. 20. <sup>20)</sup> II. 30—32. <sup>21)</sup> *yogāṅgasamādhiyuktam bhavati*. <sup>22)</sup> I. 17—51. <sup>23)</sup> II. 28 sqq. <sup>24)</sup> See Note 7. <sup>25)</sup> *aśuddhi*, to which equally belong *kleśas*, *vṛttis*, *antarāyas*, *vitarkas*.

#### To p p. 601—606.

<sup>1)</sup> I. 17—51. <sup>2)</sup> I. 30, 31. <sup>3)</sup> Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, I. 3, p. 559. <sup>4)</sup> Es bleibt nur noch übrig, der *cittavikṣepas* zu gedenken (l. c., p. 559). <sup>5)</sup> Vermutlich einer älteren Zeit als sie (that is, die Lehre von den acht *Āṅgas*) angehörig (l. c., p. 572). <sup>6)</sup> I. 29—31. <sup>7)</sup> ohne ersichtliche Anordnung der Begriffe (l. c., p. 559). <sup>8)</sup> l. c., p. 606. <sup>9)</sup> the doctrine of *maitrī*, *śraddhā*. <sup>10)</sup> Der Yoga als Heilweg, p. 86 sqq. <sup>11)</sup> II. 49. <sup>12)</sup> II. 5, 15, 16, 34. <sup>13)</sup> Die Methoden des Yoga, p. 96. <sup>14)</sup> Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft, vol. XXVIII/1874: Hemacandras Yogaśāstra, by



Ernst Windisch, p. 185 sqq. <sup>15)</sup> l. c., p. 253, footnote. <sup>16)</sup> e. g., Nos. 46, 49, 56, 66, III. 38, 39, 40, etc. <sup>17)</sup> I. 30, 31. <sup>18)</sup> I. 33. <sup>19)</sup> I. 47. <sup>20)</sup> to I. 30. <sup>21)</sup> I. 29. <sup>22)</sup> Referring distinctly to II. 45: *Samādhi-siddhir īśvarapranidhānāt* = perfection of concentration as a result of devotion to *īśvara*. <sup>23)</sup> in I. 30, 31. <sup>24)</sup> l. c., p. 559. <sup>25)</sup> II. 1—27. How difficult it is to interpret the *kriyāyoga* text may be seen from the vagueness of II. 7—11, II. 21, 23, as ultimately admitted by J. W. Hauer himself — l. c., p. 95. <sup>26)</sup> II. 25. <sup>27)</sup> Indian Philosophy, II., p. 352. <sup>28)</sup> in I. 31. <sup>29)</sup> in II. 49. <sup>30)</sup> to I. 31. <sup>31)</sup> to I. 31 — *āsanamanasthairyaorbādhakas*. <sup>32)</sup> to II. 47 — Vyāsa: *na aṅgamejayo bhavati*. Bhoja: *samāhṛjantarāyabhūtā na prabhavantyaṅgamejayatvādayaḥ*. <sup>33)</sup> in II. 40. <sup>34)</sup> in II. 34. <sup>35)</sup> in II. 46. <sup>36)</sup> in II. 42. <sup>37)</sup> Yogasārasaṅgraha, 43. <sup>38)</sup> l. c., p. 50: *dehaprāṇendriyasamskāra* and *cittasamskāra*. <sup>39)</sup> to I. 30. <sup>40)</sup> II. 54. <sup>41)</sup> I. 8, II. 3, II. 28. <sup>42)</sup> to II. 28. <sup>43)</sup> to II. 15. <sup>44)</sup> to I. 30. <sup>45)</sup> in II. 35—48. <sup>46)</sup> in I. 32 sqq.

To p p. 606—610.

<sup>1)</sup> in I. 20. <sup>2)</sup> in I. 28 and 29. <sup>3)</sup> in I. 32. <sup>4)</sup> in I. 34. <sup>5)</sup> to II. 53. <sup>6)</sup> to II. 53. <sup>7)</sup> I. 33. <sup>8)</sup> II. 34. <sup>9)</sup> II. 1. <sup>10)</sup> II. 34. <sup>11)</sup> to I. 33. <sup>12)</sup> The Yoga-system of Patañjali. <sup>13)</sup> to I. 33. <sup>14)</sup> in I. 40. <sup>15)</sup> I. 28, 29. <sup>16)</sup> I. 32. <sup>17)</sup> Allgemeine Geschichte I, 3, p. 513, 572 sqq. <sup>18)</sup> Der Yoga als Heilweg, p. 86 sqq. <sup>19)</sup> Hauer, l. c., p. 99. <sup>20)</sup> l. c., p. 608, 620, 624. <sup>21)</sup> l. c., p. 88. <sup>22)</sup> in I. 28 and I. 32. <sup>23)</sup> in I. 28, 29. <sup>24)</sup> to I. 3. <sup>25)</sup> II 45. <sup>26)</sup> I. 23—29. <sup>27)</sup> I. 32. <sup>28)</sup> I. 34—39. <sup>29)</sup> I. 33. <sup>30)</sup> Majjhima-Nikāya, 26. <sup>31)</sup> to I. 32. <sup>32)</sup> *ekaṃ tatvam īśvaraḥ prakṛtatvād iti*. <sup>33)</sup> *ekasmin kasmimścid abhimate tattve abhyāsaścetasāḥ punaḥ punar niveśanam kuryāt*. <sup>34)</sup> I. 39. <sup>35)</sup> I. 23—29, or maybe till I. 31. <sup>36)</sup> in I. 40. <sup>37)</sup> in I. 29.

To p p. 611—615.

<sup>1)</sup> See "Methodical Principle . . .", Archiv Orientální, 1951, p. 194 sqq. <sup>2)</sup> Indische Philosophie, p. 194. <sup>3)</sup> l. c., p. 604, 608. <sup>4)</sup> l. c., p. 86 sqq. <sup>5)</sup> I. 32. <sup>6)</sup> I. 12 sqq.: Vyāsa, Vācaspati and Bhoja. <sup>7)</sup> to I. 32. <sup>8)</sup> p. 26. <sup>9)</sup> I. 23—I. 40. <sup>10)</sup> I. 17—I. 22. <sup>11)</sup> *icchā, vīrya, utsāha*, I. 12. <sup>12)</sup> I. 17—I. 21, maybe till I. 23 qq. <sup>13)</sup> to I. 29. <sup>14)</sup> I. 32. <sup>15)</sup> I. 39. <sup>16)</sup> III. 2. <sup>17)</sup> I. 34. <sup>18)</sup> I. 36. <sup>19)</sup> I. 33. <sup>20)</sup> I. 40. <sup>21)</sup> III. 24. <sup>22)</sup> I. 23—29. <sup>23)</sup> See Archiv Orientální, 1951, p. 194 sqq. <sup>24)</sup> To I. 25, see also Jacobi l. c., p. 617 sqq. <sup>25)</sup> To I. 25. <sup>26)</sup> I. 29. <sup>27)</sup> I. 3. <sup>28)</sup> To I. 32.